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INTRODUCTION
Most torts professors have simply taken for granted that tort law is
essentially state law: in America this is the way things are and have always
been. In early 1995, however, both houses of Congress passed significant tort
reform bills, raising in a dramatic way the question of the proper federal role
in tort law. Since then, I have been able to develop my thoughts on the
federalism issue at several conferences, including the one sponsored by Yale's
two journals.2 What was unique about the Yale conference on federalism was
the extent to which discussion focused on possible biases operating in a variety
of policy areas on the state lawmaking process, biases that are conducive to
undesirable policy outcomes. In particular, the Yale conference was heavily
influenced by the theme of "race to the bottom," and variations on that theme.
Several analysts have indeed applied the "race" theme to products liability,
and hence have criticized our products liability system in its current state-
oriented form. This Comment restates their argument and provides a critical
evaluation of its soundness. The Comment then identifies and assesses recent
t William D. Warren Professor, U.C.L.A. School of Law.
1. A conference committee compromise was finally approved by both the Senate and the House in
late March 1996. On May 2 the bill was then vetoed by President Clinton, in part because it would
"inappropriately intrudefI on state authority." Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Vetoes Liability Limits in Product
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at Al, AS. My Comment does not address the particulars of this
legislation. Instead, it considers the more general question of the adequacy of the state lawmaking
process.
2. The fullest expression of my current views can be found in Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the
Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIz. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
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recommendations for solving the problem of structural bias by initially
preserving state lawmaking authority but then modifying the choice-of-law rules
that accompany and supplement state products liability rules.
I. STRUCTURAL BIAS AS A POSSIBLE PROBLEM
Begin with the standard case in which A is the state of residence, injury,
and retail sale, while B is the state of manufacture. Assume furthermore that
the court would clearly apply State A's law. What incentives does this give
lawmakers in State A as they develop their relevant products liability rules? If
those lawmakers increase liability, they benefit in-state residents with larger
compensation payments, while exporting the costs of this to out-of-state
manufacturers and product consumers (and company shareholders) throughout
the nation.3 All of this can give those lawmakers a bias towards expanding
liability. Call this a "race to the top" (where "the top" refers not to the actual
quality or efficiency of liability rules but rather the level of the liability rights
they confer on accident victims).4 In a 1988 paper, Michael McConnell,
affirming this "structural bias" in products liability lawmaking, observed that
"states pursue a persistent and one-directional race towards ever-higher plaintiff
recoveries, a race whose outcome does not necessarily represent the considered
judgment of decision makers in the several states."' In his 1988 book The
Product Liability Mess,6 Richard Neely-then a judge on the West Virginia
Supreme Court-evaluated modem products liability lawmaking in an
essentially similar way.7
The structural bias position, then, has been adopted by leading analysts. If
the position is accurate, then it would be desirable to replace state lawmaking'
3. The premise here is that there is no practical way in which manufacturers can adjust their prices
state-by-state to take into account particular states' liability positions. See Edmund W. Kitch, Can
Washington Repair the Tort System?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 102, 109-10 (Walter Olson
ed., 1988) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].
4. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1219 (1992)
(discussing ambiguity in various versions of "race" terminology).
5. Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Liability Reform, in NEW
DIRECTIONS, supra note 3, at 90, 92-97.
6. RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS (1988).
7. In the same year, Richard Epstein offered about the same analysis. Richard A. Epstein, The
Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REv. 311, 312 (1988). Epstein mainly
described state legislatures' unwillingness to adopt statutes that would limit products liability rights. But
his structural point would equally apply to those legislatures' willingness to expand products liability
rights.
8. Bruce Hay assumes that state lawmakers express their preference for in-state victims by
manipulating not just the doctrines of products liability but the combination of those doctrines and
choice-of-law rules. Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability
System, 80 GEo. L. REv. 617, 627 (1992). Under Hay's account, the games that state lawmakers play
are even more complex than the game suggested in my text above. But the problem of state lawmaking
biased in favor of in-state interests remains the same. As it happens, as Hay considers the strategies that
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with national lawmaking. For at the national level, the particular problem of
bias that might afflict state lawmaking is all but eliminated. National lawmakers
are in a satisfactory position to balance the interests of all consumers and all
manufacturers. 9
Does the position accurately describe reality, however? On this score, one
interesting item of evidence is Judge Neely's own opinion, on behalf of the
West Virginia Supreme Court, in Blankenship v. General Motors Corpora-
tion."' In its first holding in Blankenship, the court adopted the doctrine of
crashworthiness liability. In doing so, the court indicated doubts about the
wisdom of this doctrine.' Nevertheless, the court noted that the doctrine had
been adopted in almost every other jurisdiction in the country. Perceiving that
West Virginia residents were already paying for the crashworthiness doctrine
as applied nationwide by way of the product liability premium markup in the
cost of cars sold in West Virginia, the court ruled that West Virginia should
join the national consensus as to crashworthiness liability."2 Next, the court
considered the "causation" issue in crashworthiness cases. At the time of
Blankenship, American jurisdictions were divided between the Huddell rule,'3
requiring the plaintiff to prove what added injuries were due to the absence of
1crashworthiness features, and the Fox4 rule, requiring, in effect, car
manufacturers to bear the burden of proof on the issue of the second injury.
Encountering this division, the Blankenship court decided to adhere to Fox.
Indeed, the court ruled-even more broadly (and open-endedly)-that "in any
crashworthiness case where there is a split of authority [among states] on any
issue... we adopt the rule that is most liberal to the plaintiff. " s
Blankenship afforded Judge Neely an interesting opportunity to document
state lawmakers would develop in manipulating both liability rules and choice of law rules, he ends up
unable to tell whether state products liability rules are likely to be less efficient than a federal products
liability regime would be. See id. at 651 & n.91.
Hay's general analysis is marred by the apparent inaccuracy in his key assumption about the
substance of choice-of-law doctrine. Hay perceives that modem courts apply a "governmental interest"
conflicts rule in products cases-and he assumes that this rule gives the plaintiff "the benefit of either
his own state's law or that of the [defendant's state], whichever is more favorable to [the plaintiff]." Id.
at 627. This assumption seems incorrect, insofar as it presents as a firm rule what is at best a partial
tendency in the case law. Its apparent incorrectness reduces the relevance of the specifics of Hay's
analysis.
9. Law at the national level would comply with McConnell's desire for lawmaking by an "autarky":
a jurisdiction that is "a self-sufficient economy, all of whose production and consumption [takes] place
within its own borders." McConnell, supra note 5, at 91. McConnell briefly and skeptically discusses
the possibility of federal legislation; he mentions the difficulty of amending federal legislation, and the
existence of regional variations in public preferences. But even he acknowledges that "[tihe advantages
of state over federal legislation should not be exaggerated." Id. at 100.
10. 406 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 1991).
11. Id. at783.
12. Id. at 784-85.
13. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
14. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
15. Id. at 786.
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his own diagnosis of the problem of bias in products liability decision-making.
Yet if one is looking for convincing confirmation of the Neely diagnosis,
Blankenship does not suffice. For the Blankenship opinion is coy and self-
conscious: plainly Judge Neely was deliberately trying to draw attention to
what he saw as an inherent defect in the products liability lawmaking process.
Indeed, the court's broad "split of authority" ruling seems almost deliberately
outrageous. In his book, Judge Neely had suggested that the bias in products
liability lawmaking closely resembles the forms of state legislative bias that in
other contexts have encouraged the United States Supreme Court to hold state
statutes unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. 6 It is reasonable to
believe that the open-ended "split of authority" holding in Blankenship was
included by Judge Neely in order to attract the attention of the Supreme Court
and hence invite that Court to reverse his own opinion on Commerce Clause
grounds. 1
7
Blankenship, then, should be put to one side in inquiring whether state
lawmaking systematically promotes in-state interests in the crass way that
Neely suggests. In considering the McConnell-Neely claim of structural bias,
several lines of analysis suggest the need for real caution.
An initial point is that products liability doctrine originally comes from
judges rather than legislators. Even given the increasing significance of
contested judicial elections at the state level,"8 state court judges remain far
less burdened by the requirements of electoral politics than state legislators.
Judges therefore do not need to cater to voters in the same way that legislators
do. Indeed, most observers assume that judges do decide cases mainly along
the lines of their own perceptions of the public interest. Judge Neely himself,
while describing state court judges as "political hacks,"19 appraises them as
seeking "the most practical way to achieve their vision of the just social
contract." 2° Jonathan Macey, even while emphasizing the tendency for
legislatures to deliver statutes to well-organized interest groups, believes that
the independence of the judiciary is meaningful and that judges can and do
decide cases in a public-interest way.2 Although Judge Posner has developed
an interest-group theory of regulation,' he believes that judges decide
16. NEELY, supra note 6, at 79.
17. In fact, the defendant, bypassing its opportunity, did not apply for a certiorari writ.
18. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. Cmi. L. REv. 689 (1995). Judge Posner's observation is that "state judges are on average less
independent from political influences... than federal judges." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS 191 (1985).
19. NEELY, supra note 6, at 128.
20. Id. at 135.
21. JonathanR. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
22. See Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sca. 22 (1971).
Symposium Issue:359, 1996
State Products Liability Lawmaking
important cases in accord with their own actual "values."' George Priest,
while regarding modem products liability as a disaster, assumes that this
disaster has been produced by judicial views as to the public interest (views
that Priest regards as inaccurate).2'
I share in the understanding that judges decide cases mainly in accordance
with their own sense of the public interest. Yet despite this understanding,
there is at least a variation of the argument about structural bias in judicial
decision-making that may well be appropriate. It is not hard to find state court
products opinions which, in expanding liability, seem to devalue manufactur-
ers' arguments that the proposed expansion would treat manufacturers unfairly
or would impose excessive costs on manufacturers. It may be easy for state
courts to neglect those added costs when the judges can intuit that the costs will
not be borne by in-state actors; and state court judges can more conveniently
neglect a defendant's claim of unfairness when the defendant is not part of the
judges' own political community.'s Put it this way: even judges seeking to
promote the public interest might, at least implicitly,' define the "public" in
terms of the "state."27
Yet I should stress the limited import of my assessment as an explanation
for the expansion of modem products liability doctrine. Consider the following
landmark judicial opinions: Larsen v. General Motors Corporation,s
establishing liability for crashworthiness; Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corporation,29 providing the framework for asbestos litigation; Davis v.
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 132 (1995); see also id. at 121 ("[J]udges impose
their political vision on society.").
24. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modem Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
25. Michigan is a state of auto makers, who are frequently sued for alleged design failings. And
the Michigan Supreme Court has conservatively ruled that design claims sound in negligence only. See
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1984); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers, 326 N.W.2d 372
(Mich. 1982) (forklift). Moreover, a Michigan intermediate court has recently adopted a conservative
rule on burden-of-proof in auto crashworthiness cases. See Sumner v. General Motors Corp., 538
N.W.2d 112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). Many drug manufacturers are located in New Jersey; and the New
Jersey Supreme Court backed away from the doctrine of liability for unknowable hazards in a case
involving a drug-company defendant. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
Given the limited weight that modem choice-of-law rules place on the state of the defendant's residence,
the actual benefit that auto makers and drug manufacturers received from these courts' rulings was
limited. Even so, the courts' results were undoubtedly influenced by the courts' appreciation of the valid
interests of the defendant industries; and this appreciation was naturally facilitated by the industry's
conspicuous presence within the state.
26. Judge Posuer suggests that state court judges might-in an "unconscious" way-identify
primarily with in-state interests. POSNER, supra note 18, at 177.
27. Given the limited incentive I am here ascribing to state court judges, I certainly would not
expect those judges to play the very exotic game developed by Professor Hay, a game that would
involve manipulating the combination of substantive rules and choice-of-law rules so as to maximize in
the long run the level of in-state benefits. See supra note 8.
28. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
29. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.3° and Reyes v. W1yeth Laboratories,3' broadening
the liability of the producers of vaccines. All these milestones in the expansion
of liability came not from state court judges, but rather from judges on federal
courts of appeals-sitting, moreover, in three-judge panels, in which no more
than one judge was even a resident of the state whose law was under review.
The presence of these federal-judge liability-expanding landmarks makes it
difficult to believe that state-court judges, in expanding liability, have been
influenced in any major way by mere in-state preferences. On balance, while
I am willing to acknowledge some problem of neglect of out-of-state interests
in state court products liability lawmaking, the problem seems only a limited
one.
The discussion above has downplayed the claim of structural bias by
emphasizing the traditional role of the judiciary in developing products liability
doctrine. Admittedly, however, products liability at the state level is increasing-
ly being managed by state legislatures. For such decisionmakers, the claim of
structural bias has far more appeal, given the responsiveness of those
legislators to the preferences of local voters. Still, there are offsetting points.
First, any premise that legislators are driven exclusively by a desire for
reelection is overstated. As most observers agree, legislators are influenced at
least in part by the ideas they hold or the ideologies they adhere to relating to
the public interest.32 A perhaps realistic assessment is that a statutory
proposal, to secure enactment, must be backed up by a combination of a
favorable political configuration and a plausible public-policy rationale. A
second point draws on the reasoning in products liability opinions themselves.
Those opinions typically build on the premise that consumers underestimate the
risks of product-related injuries. 33 Yet if consumers do underestimate these
risks, then consumers, in their role as voters, will likewise underestimate the
value of products liability rights that state lawmakers may bestow on them. If
so, then they will insufficiently reward legislators who expand those rights.'
But perhaps an even more basic point is this. Even if narrowly rational
lawmakers care primarily about their reelection prospects, those prospects
depend in significant part on their success in fundraising. Manufacturers-even
those whose principal places of business are out-of-state-are few enough in
30. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
31. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? 4, 278 (1995); DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP
P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23-33 (1991); RICHARD FENNO, HOME STYLE 214-32 (1978);
BARBARA SINCLAIR, LEGISLATORS, LEADERS, AND LAWMAKING 10-11 (1995); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond
Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation
in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 80-87 (1990).
33. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
34. See Mark Giestfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability
Refonn, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803 (1994).
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number as to minimize free-rider problems as they mount fundraising and
lobbying efforts. By contrast, product consumers-even those located within
a particular state-remain a diffuse group, in a poor position to engage in
fundraising and lobbying. Even out-of-state manufacturers, then, may be able
to lobby effectively with state legislatures.35 Given this point, it is not
surprising that most of the products liability reform statutes adopted by states
in the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s contained provisions favoring manufactur-
er-defendants rather than consumer-plaintiffs. In 1987, my own state,
California, adopted a reform statute providing tobacco companies with an
explicit liability shelter.36 It is no secret in California that Willie Brown, then
the Speaker of the California Assembly, was receiving mammoth campaign
contributions from tobacco companies.
To recap, the problem of structural bias identified by McConnell and Neely
may be present, but is far less serious than they suggest. At the legislative and
judicial levels, it is no more than a moderate problem. Even so, the problem
exists, and has relevance in any review of the desirability of state control of
products liability doctrine.
II. CHOICE OF LAW SOLUTIONS
Part I has discussed an apparent problem of structural bias in the current
system of state products liability lawmaking, which could result in excessive
levels of liability. The prospect of bias to one side, I can acknowledge my own
view that a state products liability regime creates a significant problem of non-
uniformity in legal doctrine.37 Having identified these problems, I can turn to
solutions that certain analysts have identified-solutions that would preserve
products liability lawmaking at the state level (rather than entrusting products
liability to national lawmakers). All these solutions involve adjusting the
choice-of-law rules that apply to products liability claims. In a 1987 article that
opposed the federalization of products liability, Harvey Perlman acknowledged
the bias or cost spill-over problem in state products liability lawmaking.38 To
preserve state lawmaking yet remedy the problem, Perlman suggested that
manufacturers in selling products "be permitted to designate the state law
applicable to their liability." 39 Michael McConnell's recommended solution
to the structural bias problem is a federal choice-of-law rule under which the
35. The political advantages enjoyed by manufacturers in the products liability reform process are
heavily emphasized in NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSITrUIIONS IN
LAW, EcONOMIcS, AND PuBuc PoLIcY 192-95 (1994).
36. CAL. CrV. CODE ANN. § 1714.45(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995-96) (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
37. This position is developed in Schwartz, supra note 2.
38. Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue of Federalism, 48 OHIO
ST. L. J. 503, 508 (1987).
39. Id.
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law of the state in which the product is originally sold is applied." William
Niskanen, in a current article, opposes the federalization of products liability,
yet acknowledges problems with state lawmaking.4 He too would solve those
problems by having Congress establish a new choice of law rule. What
Niskanen recommends is that Congress specify that courts hearing products
liability cases apply the law of the jurisdiction in which the manufacturer has
its largest number of employees.42
Note, first of all, that while all these proposals oppose Congressional
authority over products liability doctrine, they all assign to Congress at least
the responsibility for determining choice-of-law rules: to this extent, they
support a limited measure of nationalization. McConnell's recommendation is
designed to cure the problem of structural bias by enabling manufactur-
ers-now aware of the solid new choice-of-law rule-to adjust their prices to
take account of whatever liability doctrines prevail within the state of sale. Yet
the McConnell recommendation offers no solution to the problem of 50-state
non-uniformity. That problem would, however, be solved by acceptance of
either the Perlman or the Niskanen recommendation.43 This is the necessary
and intended result of Niskanen's recommendation, since a manufacturer can
only have one principal place of business. It is the likely result of Perlman's
recommendation, since a manufacturer would probably see a strong advantage
in designating a single state's law to apply to all of its product sales.
While the Perlman and Niskanen proposals would hence solve the problem
of non-uniform state law, the very meaning of state law under either
recommendation would be unusual. Under Perlman's proposal, a state would
adopt product liability rules without any idea about (or control over) which
claims by which consumers against which manufacturers would be governed
by that rule.' Under these circumstances, the notion of democratic self-
government at the state level seems misplaced. That notion of state democracy
likewise has little application to the model of state corporate law that Niskanen
uses by way of analogy. Under that model, as developed by Roberta
Romano,4' corporations pay to a state such as Delaware an annual incorpora-
tion fee and receive in exchange the body of corporation law that a state such
as Delaware has developed. But the manufacturer that legally incorporates in
40. See McConnell, supra note 5, at 98. This is an alternative also endorsed by Perlman, supra
note 38, at 508.
41. William Niskanen, Do Not Federalize Tort Law, REGULATION, 1995, No. 4, at 34, 36-37.
42. Id. at 37.
43. It should be noted, however, that this problem does not really trouble Perlman. His
recommendation is designed mainly to solve what he sees as a possible problem of structural bias.
Perlman, supra note 38, at 508.
44. On the extent to which Perlman's recommendation goes well beyond what courts currently
tolerate by way of allowing parties to a contract to designate which state's law applies, see Larry
E. Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 261-66 (1993).
45. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
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Delaware almost always has its primary business operations located elsewhere.
Under the Romano model, Delaware is not really engaging in democratic self-
government; rather, it is offering for sale a particular body of law that
corporations might be inclined to purchase. Niskanen's recommendation is,
from the perspective of local democracy, somewhat less odd: the manufacturer
would at least be a resident of the state whose law would be applied when the
manufacturer is a products liability defendant.
Moreover, the Perlman and Niskanen recommendations, each in its own
way, raise the prospect of a "race to the bottom"-where "bottom" relates not
to the low quality or inefficiency of products liability rules but rather to the
low level of rights they confer on accident victims. 46 Perlman's recommenda-
tion assumes that individual states would adopt their own products liability
rules somewhat randomly, for reasons that each state finds satisfactory. Still,
the manufacturer, given the option of designating the state whose law would
apply, would be inclined to choose the state with lenient rules. Thus, if the
doctrine of crashworthiness liability is accepted in many states but rejected in
Virginia,47 then General Motors, in offering its cars for sale, might well opt
for Virginia law. Under Niskanen's quite different proposal, a drug company,
in expanding its workforce, might locate its job site in a state whose liability
rules are favorable to such companies. Moreover, manufacturers which are
already located within a particular state would seek to lobby that state's
legislature (and encourage that state's courts) to render more lenient that state's
products liability standards. An auto manufacturer located in Michigan, for
example, would be in a position to fight for more lenient design defect rules
and more stringent afrative defenses.
Attention should be given to the likely efficacy of such a company's
lobbying efforts. Even if a company's principal place of business is within a
particular state, when that state toughens liability standards the burden will
primarily be borne by shareholders and/or consumers located throughout the
nation. To this extent, the in-state manufacturer is in the same lobbying
position as an out-of-state manufacturer. Even so, the principal-place-of-
business state that is revising products liability rules has an interest in
preventing employment losses, and for that matter creating employment gains;
likewise, that state wants to preserve and increase the revenues derived from
business-related taxes. Accordingly, the state has a strong interest in dissuading
manufacturers from quitting the state and indeed encouraging manufacturers to
relocate into the state.4" Moreover, at the state level the managers of an in-
46. On the ambiguity of "race" terminology, see Revesz, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
47. See Sloane v. General Motors Corp., 457 S.E.2d 51 (Va. 1995). While Sloane rejects any
separate doctrine of "crashworthiness," the case seems to allow crashworthiness claims to be pleaded
under the general heading of negligence.
48. See Revesz, supra note 4, analyzing this in Prisoner's Dilemma terms.
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state company can be expected to be effective lobbyists. Those managers can
speak for the company itself, and also for its workforce, which would be
harmed by either relocation or layoffs; moreover, those managers would likely
serve as effective spokesmen for the entire in-state business community. An
additional point is that the Niskanen plan would give manufacturers of the same
genre of products an interest in concentrating their locations within a particular
state. Thus, auto manufacturers could all locate in Michigan, in a way that
would make them a potent lobby for products liability reforms that would be
of special relevance in motor vehicle cases. Similarly, drug companies could
congregate in New Jersey, where they could effectively lobby New Jersey
lawmakers for the relaxation of particular rules that can be onerous to drug
companies as tort defendants.
Of course, any tendency to conduct a race to the bottom could be offset by
market pressures operating on manufacturers. This is Perlman's understanding:
"If Californians wanted liberal liability recovery, they could purchase
'California' products which would be priced accordingly. If they preferred
'Nebraska' products with reduced liability protection, they might be permitted
to buy them."49 This is Niskanen's evaluation as well, as he compares the
market for consumer products to the stock market for company shares:50 just
as the need to satisfy potential investors encourages companies to incorporate
in states with efficient rules on corporate law,5" so manufacturers' interest in
attracting consumers will incline them to select a state which provides
consumers with an efficient set of products liability rights.
Niskanen's comparison of the market for consumer products and the market
for corporate equities is a problem, however. Investors have lots of choices:
there are, after all, 500 companies in the Standard & Poor's 500, and the
investor in dealing with a single stockbroker can purchase shares in any of
these companies. A consumer seeking to purchase a power tool or an
automobile faces a far more restrained range of choices. Moreover, stock
market investors are typically sophisticated. Roughly half of all corporate
equities are now held by institutions;52 and even individuals who buy stocks
typically purchase publications such as Barrons in order to learn what they
think they need to know. The average consumer buying a product in the
marketplace lacks this element of sophistication.
At the least, the consumer's lack of information and/or bargaining
49. Perlman, supra note 38, at 508.
50. Niskanen, supra note 41, at 37.
51. This is the model of state incorporation law originally asserted by Ralph Winter and more
recently developed by Roberta Romano. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); ROMANO, supra note 45.
52. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 671, 692-93 (1995).
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sophistication is a major premise in both products liability theory and doctrine.
For example, current products liability doctrine holds that because consumers
lack both knowledge and bargaining power, they cannot be allowed to disclaim
by contract their tort liability rights. 53 For similar reasons, products liability
doctrine basically does not recognize the defense of assumption of risk: the
consumer can sue, complaining about the absence of a possibly desirable safety
device, even though the consumer in purchasing or agreeing to use the product
was well aware that the safety device was absent.' Consider, moreover, an
employer that provides to its employees an industrial product it has purchased
from the manufacturer. Since the employer contracts upstream with the
manufacturer and downstream with its employees, economists would insist that
an indirect contractual relationship runs from the manufacturer to the
employees. Yet modem products liability, in routinely allowing such employees
to sue the manufacturer, ignores this indirect contract, and essentially treats
these employees as though they were little more than innocent bystanders.
Given these basic themes in the modem products liability regime, the
recommendations extended by Perlman and Niskanen cannot be regarded as
mere amendments seeking to improve or perfect that regime. Rather, they
incorporate reasoning that has the ability to undermine that regime. Indeed, that
seems to be precisely Niskanen's purpose. In a recent presentation, he was
explicit in expressing his view that modem products liability has committed
fundamental error in the way that it has allowed contract to be subordinated to
tort.5
5
In this Comment it is not my general purpose to defend or justify that
regime's anti-contract assumptions. Still, I can observe that the particular form
of market reasoning which Perlman and Niskanen endorse is difficult to accept.
It seems unreal to assume that consumers have, or can easily acquire, an
adequate understanding of the differences between products liability doctrines
in states such as Nebraska, New York, and Washington. I myself am a scholar
specializing in products liability; yet in shopping for products, I would be hard-
pressed to explain how the products liability doctrines in these states compare
and contrast. To assume that ordinary consumers could make the relevant
comparisons ignores the Coasian costs of information, and the asymmetry of
those costs between consumers and manufacturers. To be sure, consumers
might be aided by negative advertising. But economists have long appreciated
53. See RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965); RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW-TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 13 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
54. See the new Restatement's rejection of an "open and obvious" limitation on design liability.
Id. at § 2 cmt. c.
55. In his after-dinner speech on October 13, 1995, at a conference held by the Michigan Law &
Policy Review, Niskanen relied heavily on the condemnation of modem products liability contained in
Paul Rubin, Fundamental Reform of Tort Law, REGULATiON, 1995, No. 4, at 26.
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that negative advertising is often counterproductive or insufficient. One
problem is that negative advertising is in a sense a public good, which the
market therefore underproduces. Assume that General Motors (under Perlman's
proposal) adopts Virginia law, 6 and that Ford is considering running an
advertisement which points out that General Motors is depriving consumers of
the full protection of crashworthiness liability. While that advertisement might
cut into General Motors' sales, it will provide benefits not only to Ford, but
also to Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan. Aware of this, Ford will be less
likely to run the ad itself.
CONCLUSION
Is there a structural bias in state products liability lawmaking that leads to
an inappropriate level of liability? Certainly, the argument on behalf of bias is
intellectually intriguing. Yet when several complicating factors are taken into
account, the argument loses much-though not all-of its force. A quite
separate argument against state products liability lawmaking dwells on all the
practical disadvantages of non-uniformity in legal doctrine. Several analysts
have contended that state products liability lawmaking can be preserved-and
these problems solved-by making appropriate modifications in the choice-of-
law rules that supplement products liability doctrine. These arguments are
likewise intriguing. But similarly, they do not hold up well under analysis. One
specific point is that the various choice-of-law recommendations essentially rest
on the premise that the liability of manufacturers to injured product users can
properly be dealt with on a contractual basis. Yet there is a lack of realism in
the specific contractual claim that choice-of-law reformers advance-that
consumers, in shopping for products, can intelligently compare the particular
combinations of products liability rules in effect in various states. In any event,
the entire body of national products liability doctrine rests on an explicit
premise that a tort approach and not a contract approach is what the law of
products liability needs. Whether or not that premise is correct, it is the
premise on which the structure of doctrine has been constructed. The choice-of-
law recommendations therefore are not merely efforts to somewhat improve the
current system of products liability lawmaking. Rather, they attempt, either
explicitly or implicitly, to subvert the existing liability regime. The recommen-
dations should hence be understood and evaluated in those terms.
56. See supra note 47, and accompanying text.
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